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Abstract / Résumé
This paper examines, in a Canadian context, the effect of short sales regulation on the
risk-return relationship. Drawing from Jarrows work (1980), we derive an equilibrium risk-
return relationship that accounts for both heterogeneous expectations and short sales
regulation. We conclude that the required rate of return on risky assets in a world where short
sales are forbidden is equal to the required rate which would prevail in a world free of short
sales restrictions, minus an opportunity cost induced by short sales regulation. We show that,
theoretically, this opportunity cost is positively related to the dispersion of agents beliefs and
negatively related to the securitys liquidity level. We test the model over the sixty-month period
from January 1985 through December 1989 and use 13079 observations (220 companies on
average). We pool all the observations into a time series cross-sectional model and use
Litzenberger and Ramaswamys methodology (1979) to address three econometric problems:
heteroscedasticity, cross-correlation of disturbance terms and beta measurement errors. The
results permit us to establish that a negative linear relationship links expected risky asset returns
and the divergence of agents beliefs. This negative relationship is consistent with the presence
of opportunity costs resulting from short sales regulation when return beliefs are heterogeneous.
We find that the negative relationship between security returns and dispersion of beliefs is
essentially confined to illiquid securities, that is, those monitored by a small number of analysts.
Finally, these results are not modified when tested on two sub-periods nor when we introduce
two control variables (size, as measured by the number of analysts monitoring the stock, and
January effect).
Létude traite de leffet de la réglementation des ventes à découvert sur la relation
rendement-risque, au Canada. À partir du cadre développé par Jarrow (1980), nous développons
une expression de la relation rendement-risque lorsque les anticipations des agents sont hétérogènes
et les ventes à découvert sont restreintes. Il apparaît alors que les restrictions sur les ventes à
découvert induisent un coût dopportunité qui réduit le taux de rendement anticipé. Ce coût
dopportunité devrait être une fonction positive de la dispersion des anticipations et une fonction
négative du niveau de liquidité du titre. Ces hypothèses sont vérifiées à laide de données
mensuelles, qui couvrent la période de janvier 1985 à décembre 1989. La méthodologie de
Litzenberger et Ramaswamy (1979), est utilisée afin de résoudre les divers problèmes
économétriques. Les résultats montrent une relation linéaire négative entre le rendement des titres
et le niveau dhétérogénéité des anticipations, mesuré par la dispersion des prévisions des analystes
financiers. Cette relation est surtout observable pour les titres les moins liquides, qui sont ici les
moins suivis par les analystes financiers. Ces résultats valent pour chaque sous période et résistent
à lintroduction de variables de contrôle.
Key words: heterogeneous expectations, short sales regulation, dispersion of analysts forecasts.
Mots clé : anticipation, hétérogènes, réglementation des ventes à découvert, dispersion, prévision des
analystes.
When agents beliefs are homogeneous, no short positions are held at equilibrium (Bamberg and1
Spremann, 1986). Thus, the analysis of the effect of short sales regulation on risky asset returns has to be
conducted in a world in which investors have heterogeneous beliefs. Nevertheless, in some special cases,
the short selling of risky assets may be deemed optimal by some investors even when agents beliefs are
homogeneous: if future endowments are stochastic or if agents have state dependent utility functions
(Detemple, 1990).
2
This paper examines the effects of short sales regulation on the risk-return
relationship, in a world in which agents have heterogeneous beliefs over future asset
returns . Short sales regulation is an important element of capital market micro-1
structure and has already caught the attention of several researchers. Lintner (1969),
Miller (1977), Jarrow (1980), Figlewski (1981), Peterson and Peterson (1982b), and
Mayshar (1983) studied the valuation effects of restricting pessimistic investors
opportunity to sell securities short. They argue that short sales regulation has
significant effects on information aggregation due to its asymmetric impact on
investors with favorable and unfavorable information. Risky asset prices do not reflect
average beliefs since the transactions of optimistic investors outweigh those of
pessimistic investors in the formation of asset prices. In these Walrasian equilibrium
models based on prior beliefs, risky asset prices are higher than those that would
prevail in a similar economy in which short sales were unrestricted. This systematic
overvaluation of risky assets induced by market institutions is inconsistent with the
existence of rational investors who should eventually adjust their expectations with
respect to market imperfections. In fact, the overvaluation effect of short sales
regulation on risky asset prices would be absent in a fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium model. However, only noisy rational expectations
equilibrium models are consistent with the dynamics of financial markets. In such
models, due to various sources of noise, investors can only partially adjust
expectations for one fraction of the short sales regulation effect. Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987) show that short sales regulation eliminates some of the transactions
and reduces adjustment of prices to private information.
Very little empirical work has been done to validate the overvaluation
hypothesis and, up to now, the results are inconclusive. Figlewski (1981) finds a
significant negative relationship between risky asset returns and short interest, with the
latter used as a proxy for the amount of negative information which would otherwise
results in short sales were there no restrictions. Repeating the same tests on another
period, Figlewski and Webb (1993) still show the relationship to be negative, albeit
non-significant. The use of the recorded short interest as a proxy for the amount of
adverse information excluded from the market price requires that observed short
positions be proportional to short sales to be undertaken in the absence of restrictions.
However, empirical results from Peterson and Waldman (1984) and Brent, Morse and
Stice (1990) contradict this relationship. Constraints on short sales are different among
3securities (margin requirements, the securitys liquidity level) and among investors
(legal or contractual prohibitions on institutional investors).
This paper aims to test the hypothesis of a short sales regulation effect on the
risk-return relationship. First, basing our theoretical argument on Jarrows work
(1980), we show in a mean-variance framework that the positive price differential due
to short sales regulation results in a negative return differential. We derive an
equilibrium relationship in which the constrained expected rate of return on risky
assets is equal to the unconstrained rate of return minus an opportunity cost due to
short sales regulation. Second, we show that this opportunity cost is a positive function
of the number of constrained investors and of the importance of the investors
individual opportunity costs. These two variables are directly related to the divergence
of investors beliefs. This formalization enables us to reach a proper econometric
model specification. Third, we use the Litzenberger and Ramaswamys methodology
(1979) to test the model. We pool all the observations into a time series cross-
sectional model. We test the model over the sixty-month period from January 1985
through December 1989 and use 13079 observations (220 firms on average), a much
larger sample than those employed in previous studies. Finally, this empirical test
permits us to establish that a negative linear relationship links expected risky asset
returns and the opportunity costs induced by short sales regulation as measured by the
divergence of agents beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we present the
theoretical model and a version of the CAPM that accounts both for heterogeneous
expectations and short sales regulation. The methodology and different model
specifications are described in the second section. In the last section, we present the
data and discuss the results.
1 THE MODEL
1.1 Definitions and assumptions
Contrary to the CAPM, the analytical framework used here rests upon a
double set of assumptions concerning agent utility functions (A1) and the distribution
of risky asset prices (A2). The heterogeneity of agent beliefs is addressed in
assumption (A3). Finally, short sales regulation is formalized through assumption
(A4).
The overvaluation effect of short sales on security prices only holds true when agents beliefs as to E (X)2 k
differ from the average expected prices and when the expected price covariance matrices are homogeneous,
diagonal or identical up to a positive factor (Bamberg and Spremann, 1986). In the case where expected
covariance matrices differ, the impact on security prices is ambiguous due to possible substitution effects
(Jarrow, 1980).
Reality is in fact an intermediate case, for short sales are simply discouraged. No short sale is permitted3
except on a rising price (uptick rule) or if the last previous change price was upward (zero plus tick rule).
The main impediment to short sales, however, is the withholding of the sale proceeds from the investor. The
proceeds from the sale are held by the broker as collateral for the borrowed stock (Figlewski, 1981).
The expected future wealth, E (W ), and the variance of future wealth, Var (W ), are given by:4 k k1 k k1
E (W ) = q E (X) + R (W - q P) and Var(W ) = q Sqk k1 k f k0 k1k k k k
t t t
4
(A1) Investors behave as risk-averse expected utility maximizers of end-of-period
wealth. Each investor displays constant absolute risk aversion (A >0) and hisk
utility function can be rewritten as a negative exponential function of the
type: U (W ) = exp(-A W ) where W stands for the wealth of the kk k1 k k1 k1
th
investor at time t=1.
(A2) Prices of the J risky assets (j=1,...,J) are multivariate stochastic normally-
distributed variables. The risky asset price vectors at time t=0 and time t=1
are respectively denoted P and X.
(A3) Investors (k=1,...,N) behave as price-takers and have partially heterogeneous
beliefs :2
a) each investor has his own estimate of the expected price vector E (X).k
b) all investors share the same covariance matrix of risky assets prices,
S =S, k.
k
(A4) Short sales are forbidden . Consequently, the quantity of risky assets of the3
j firm held by the k investor at time t=0, is either positive or null.th th
We shall now determine the risky asset price equilibrium relationship for an
economy with heterogeneous agent beliefs, assuming short sales are forbidden (A4).
1.2 Heterogeneous beliefs, restrictions on short sales and security prices
We consider a single period economy composed of J risky assets and one
risk-free asset. Since W is normally distributed, with mean E (W )=µ and variancek1 k k1 k
4
Var (W )=F , the constrained portfolio selection problem for the k investor is thek k1 k
2 th
following:
5Max E [-exp(-A W )] /Max µ - (A /2)F /Max q (E (X) - R P) + RW - (A /2)q Sq (1)k k k1 k k k k f f k0 k
2
k k k
t t
q q q
k k k
subject to the constraint on short sales: q $ 0
k
where q = (q ,...,q ) stands for the vector of risky asset quantities sought by the kk k1 kJ
t th
investor and where r stands for the rate of return on the risk-free asset (R =1+r ). qf f f k
*
= (q ,...,q ) is the optimal solution of this non-linear problem if and only if therek 1 k J
* * t
exist J Lagrange multipliers u (j=1,...,J) such that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions arej
satisfied:
E (X) - R P - A Sq + u = 0, (2)k f k k k
u q = 0, u $ 0, q $ 0 (3)
k k k k
t
The k investors demand for risky assets is:th
q = (A S) (E (X) - R P) + (A S) u (4)
k k
* -1 -1
k k f k
The first term on the right-hand side of (4) represents the demand for risky assets in
a world without restrictions on short sales. The second term represents the differential
demand due to the forbidding of short sales.
Market equilibrium requires that aggregate demand equal aggregate supply
of risky assetsQ = (Q ,...,Q ) . Under this equilibrium condition, we can solve for the1 J
t
risky asset equilibrium price vector, P, (Jarrow, 1980, eq.14):
P = R {(E " E (X)) - J SQ} + R {E " u } (5)f k =1 k k f k =1 k-1 N -1 -1 N k
u q = 0, u $ 0, q $ 0 for k=1,...,Nk k k k
t
where" = A /(E A ) = J /(E J ) = J /J is the ratio of the k investors riskk k k=1 k k k =1 k k-1 N -1 N th
tolerance to the sum of investors risk tolerances.
The first term on the right-hand side of (5) represents the equilibrium price
vector in a market without restrictions on short sales. The second term represents the
price differential due to restrictions on short sales. It is equal to the present value of
a weighted mean of implicit price vectors related to constraints on short sales, denoted
u . Each weight is equal to " , that is, the ratio of the k investors risk tolerance tok k
th
the sum of investors risk tolerances. Since the implicit prices, u , are either positivekj
or null, the second term is also positive or null. If the constraint on short sales is
binding for at least one investor, the equilibrium price of risky assets when short sales
The vector of implicit prices u is equal to D v , where v and D denote the vector of implicit returns and5
k P k k P
a diagonal matrix whose elements are risky asset prices, respectively. u = pv represents the k agentskj j kj
th
expected marginal utility pursuant to releasing the constraint on the j security. Because of the particularth
form of the agents utility functions (A1), u and v are the expected marginal increase of the k agentskj kj
th
wealth and portfolio return, respectively.
6
are forbidden is always higher than it would be in a market without such restrictions.
Equation (5) can be restated as:
P = P + R {E " u } (6)C U -1 Nf k =1 k k
where P and P respectively represent the risky asset equilibrium price vectors in aC U
world where short sales are forbidden and in an identical world where short sales are
unrestricted. The positive price differential due to short sales regulation (the market
shadow price) will result in a negative return differential (the market shadow return).
The purpose of the next section is to formalize the relationship between the market
required rate of return when short sales are forbidden, E(R) , and when short sales areC
unlimited, E(R) .U
The price equilibrium relationship (5) can be restated as a return equilibrium
relationship (see appendix 1 for details):
E " E (R) = R i + ß{(E " E (R )) - R} - {E " v } (7)k =1 k k f k =1 k k M f k =1 kN N NJ k
For the j security, the effect of short sales regulation results in an expected securityth
return lower than that would prevail in a world free of short sales restrictions. The
expected return is reduced by a factor equal to the following implicit return:
E " v . This factor represents the marginal return investors would expect to earn,k=1 k kj
N 5
on average, for the j security if the regulator were to relax the constraint by one unit.th
We can rewrite (7) as:
E(R) = R i + ß [E(R ) - R ] - v (8)f J M f
where E(R) and E(R ) stand for respectively the average expected rate of returnM
vector and the average expected market rate of return. Let us further define v as the
average market implicit return vector due to short sales regulation. The equilibrium
relationship (8) becomes:
E(R) = E(R) - v (9)C U
Hence, the result of short sales regulation is presumably to decrease the market
required rate of return on risky assets. In the next section, we proceed to formulate
more precise hypotheses, to further investigate the determinants of v , the implicitj
return on the j security.th
When short sales are unrestricted and beliefs are heterogeneous, the expected rate of return of risky assets6
are representative of the average investor: see the first term of (5).
7
(10)
(11)
(12)
1.3 The effects of short sales regulation on expected returns
For the j security, the marginal expected return for the k investor is equalth th
v if the constraint is binding. This return is a function of the difference between thekj
average return belief and the individual belief. The more pessimistic the investors6
beliefs, the greater the opportunity cost induced by short sales regulation: y =g(t)kj
where t stands for the investors belief and g(.) is a decreasing function of t (Mg/Mt<0
and g(.) bounded to the left, as asset prices cannot go below zero). The effect of short
sales regulation on expected returns can be interpreted as the sum of probabilities of
being constrained multiplied by the corresponding implicit return. If return beliefs are
normally distributed around the consensus beliefs, µ , and with a dispersion of beliefsj
F=DISP , the effect of short sales regulation on returns, -v , is equal to:j j j
Where f(t) stands for the density function of a normal distribution with mean µ andj
standard deviation F=DISP .j j
If we consider two belief distributions X and Y with means µ =µ andX Y
standard deviations F > F , we can show that (see appendix 2):X Y
When we assume a linear cost g(t)=µ -t, we have (see appendix 3):j
Thus, v is a positive function of the dispersion of beliefs about the j security, DISP .j j
th
When short sales are forbidden, the required rate of return on risky assets is an inverse
function of the divergence of agent beliefs regarding an assets return due to the
resulting overvaluation. Consequently, we predict a negative relationship between the
expected rate of return on a risky asset and the divergence of investors beliefs.
82 EMPIRICAL TESTS
2.1 Model specification
The effect of short sales regulation on the expected returns of the j security,th
-v, is a negative function of the divergence of investor beliefs: -v = ( .DISP , wherej j 2 j
( < 0. The structural form of the expected theoretical relationship is the following:2
E(R ) - R = ( + ( ß + ( DISP (13)jt ft 0 1 j 2 j
where the unknown parameters, ( , ( and ( are assumed to be constants that are0 1 2
respectively null, positive (the risk premium on the market portfolio) and negative
(( =0, ( >0 and ( <0). The econometric model used to test this relationship is based0 1 2
upon an ex post equivalent of (13):
R - R = ( + ( ß + ( DISP + , , j=1,...,J ; t=1,...,T (14)jt ft 0 1 jt 2 jt jt t
where , represents the disturbance term for the j security at time t.jt
th
Estimation of the model parameter vector '=(( , ( , ( ) in (14) must0 1 2
t
address several econometric problems. Indeed, it is likely that the disturbance term
variances differ among risky assets and that returns within a given period are cross-
correlated. Furthermore, since true betas are not observable, the betas are subject to
measurement errors. We resort to Litzenberger and Ramaswamys procedure (1979,
hereafter LR) to handle heteroscedasticity, cross-correlation of disturbance terms and
beta measurement errors. First, LR show that to correct for heteroscedasticity and
cross-correlation, we can deflate the variables by the standard deviation of residual
risk. Under such conditions, the GLS estimator, ' is equivalent to the weighted
GLS
least squares (WLS) estimator, ' . Second, LR show that the variance of
WLS
measurement errors in betas is proportional to the residual variance. To
simultaneously correct the problem of beta measurement errors, the variables can be
deflated by the standard deviation of the measurement error in betas, rather than by the
residual standard deviation. LR show that this WLS estimator is not consistent in the
presence of measurement errors. They propose a correction and show that the
corrected WLS estimator corresponds to the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator.
Though our results analysis centres on the ML estimators, the other estimators (OLS
and WLS) are reported for comparison purposes. Before we describe the data and
analyze results, we re-examine model (14) to account for a control variable likely to
modify the risk level of short sales: the securitys liquidity level. In addition, we
introduce different control variables.
The lending of securities by institutional investors facilitates short sales of highly capitalized securities that7
usually figure prominently in their portfolios.
The entire set of those securities for which option contracts are available also belongs to the group of the8
most widely monitored securities. In addition, these securities are those for which the margin requirements
are lowest. These securities are the most liquid and those for which short sales regulation is least binding.
We do not explicitely test for differences in short sales regulation with respect to individual securities,9
because the estimation of the short sales restriction level is impossible for individual securities.
9
2.2 Complementary model specifications
The analysis of section 1.3 is based on the number of investors for which
short sales regulation is binding. It implies an identical risk level for all short sales
because only DISP enters into the risk associated with the short sale of the security.j
It neglects the fact that an unhedged short sale is a speculative transaction whose
riskiness is amplified if the security is illiquid. Indeed, short sales are more attractive
when the date on which the seller must close his position is distant. However, the short
seller may be required to close his position should the owner of the underlying
securities decide to sell them and the broker is unable to borrow them elsewhere. The
probability that such a situation occurs is inversely related to the securitys liquidity
level. We measure it by the number of analysts monitoring a security, as this not only
considers the number of shares outstanding and the firms ownership structure of the
firm, but also includes the interest of institutional investors in the security (Bhushan,
1989) and the presence of the security on their lending lists . Besides, the number of7
analysts following a security appears to be one of the major explanatory variables of
its short interest, along with the existence of options (Peterson and Waldman, 1984;8
Brent, Morse and Stice, 1991). To test this complementary hypothesis, which posits
that the effect of short sales regulation on risky asset prices is greater for illiquid
securities, we have partitioned the sample into two groups based on the number of
analysts . The less (more) liquid securities appear in the first (last) group. A9
dichotomous variable reflects group membership of a security and is denoted D . Itjt
equals 0 if the security belongs to the first group (less than nine analysts) and 1
otherwise (at least nine analysts). As we want to determine whether the average effect
of short sales regulation on security returns, as captured by the ( coefficient from2
model (14), in fact conceals differences related to the securitys liquidity level, we
have estimated the coefficients of the following model:
R - R = (  + " D + (  ß + ( DISP + ( D DISP +> , j=1,...,J; t=1,...,T (15)jt ft 0 0 jt 1 jt 2 jt 3 jt jt jt
This specification enables us to test for differences in the intercept and slope
coefficients and particularly to test the null hypothesis ( = 0 against the alternative3
one: ( > 0 .3
The R of a regression of market capitalisation against the number of analysts is almost 70%.10 2
10
To validate our results, we examine if the variable DISP can be a proxy for
missing factors. We check to what extent our results are robust to the introduction of
control variables. Recently, Abarbannel, Lanen and Verrecchia (1994) extensively
examined the problems induced by the measurement of investors expectations by
analysts forecasts. They stressed that failure to control for the number of analysts in
empirical tests may lead to mispecified models. We consequently examine the
sensitivity of the coefficients in model (14) to the introduction of a control variable:
the coverage level, measured by the logarithm of the number of analysts monitoring
the stock, LnNBA (model 16).jt
R - R = (  + (  ß + (  DISP + ( Ln NBA + . , j=1,...,J; t=1,...,T (16)jt ft 0t 1 jt 2 jt 4 jt jt
Controlling for the number of analysts monitoring a security is very similar to
controlling for size . As this last effect is also closely linked to the January effect, we10
re-examine model (14) to account also for this control variable . Finally, we test
whether there is a structural change around the market crash of October 1987. In the
next section, we describe the data used to test the various hypotheses. Results are then
discussed.
3 DATA AND RESULTS
3.1 Data
The study covers the period from January 1985 through December 1989.
Monthly security returns were computed using monthly closing prices (or the average
between the bid and ask prices if no transactions took place) of the daily TSE/Western
Data Base. The risk-free rate was computed using the rate of return on 90-day
Treasury bills reported in the Bank of Canada Review. The market portfolio returns
were based on the TSE Total Return Index monthly returns. Betas, ß , residualjt
variances, and variances of measurement errors, were computed over the sixty-month
period prior to the t month considered. Descriptive monthly statistics on distributionsth
of security risk premia and betas appear in table 1. The first two moments of those
distributions are relatively stable over the 1985-1989 period. The security risk premia
and beta distributions are slightly asymmetric to the right. Whereas the former
distribution is mesokurtic, the latter is platikurtic over the entire period. Due to the
market crash, we omit October 1987 from the sample; its average monthly excess
return is -.242.
See LHer and Suret (1991) for further details regarding this database.11
We prefer this measure of relative divergence of beliefs to the standard deviation of the distribution of12
forecasted earnings per share, which is a measure of absolute divergence. The coefficient of variation is
expressed in percentage and measures the degree of homogeneity of the distribution of analysts forecasts.
Givoly and Lakonishok (1988), Varaiya (1988), Pari, Carvell and Sullivan (1989) and Atiase and Bamber
(1994) amongst others used this measure of dispersion.
In fact, analysts do not revise their forecasts daily, resulting in out-of-date proxies for the divergence13
of beliefs ( Forbes and Skerratt: 1992). By putting together up to date and out-of-date forecasts, summary
measures of dispersion of opinion overstate the true dispersion of beliefs (Stickel: 1991).
Computing the coefficient of variation with as few as 3 observations may be problematic, so we repeat14
the analysis with companies monitored by at least 5 analysts.
11
Since analysts earnings forecasts are one of the major products of the
financial analysis industry (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1984), one can reasonably assume
they are instrumental in the formulation of investors beliefs with respect to returns.
Examining analysts forecasts as a possible source of delayed stock price responses
to earnings, Abarbanell and Thomas (1992) found that analysts forecasts share
properties that are consistent with the stock price behavior. Using Granger causality
tests, Forbes and Skerratt (1992) showed the presence of instantaneous feedback
from analysts forecasts to stock price movements and conversely from stock price
movements to the revision of analysts forecasts. Then, the dispersion in financial
analyst forecasts of annual earnings per share is commonly used as a surrogate of the
unobservable dispersion in beliefs surrounding a firms future stock return
(Abarbannel, Lanen and Verrecchia, 1994). A few agencies, such as the Institutional
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), provide statistics on the distribution of analysts
earnings per share forecasts. These data are published monthly . We therefore use the11
coefficient of variation of analysts earnings forecasts, represented by CV, as an ex12
ante measure of the dispersion of investors expected returns . Monthly descriptive13
statistics relative to the distributions of coefficients of variation (table 1) show that on
average the coefficient of variation is about .35, that the distribution is bounded by
zero to the left, is asymmetric to the right and highly leptokurtic. It is almost
impossible to infer any time pattern from these statistics. However, Brown, Foster and
Noreen (1985) pointed out that the coefficient of variation is sensitive to the length of
time until the fiscal year-end; they found that it tends to diminish along the fiscal year.
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to this problem and repeat the tests using
only companies which have a fiscal year-end in December.
We retained all firms monitored by I/B/E/S during the 1985-1989 period.
Nevertheless, we impose the condition that the firm be followed by at least three
analysts . The number of firms monitored by I/B/E/S has greatly increased over time:14
from 111 in January 1985 to 244 in December 1989 (13079 observations, table 1).
The number of participating analysts has also increased. While in 1985, 75.9% of
12
securities were monitored by less than ten analysts, in 1989, this percentage went
down to 54,3% (table 2). In 1985, only 10,6% of the sample companies were
monitored by more than 13 analysts. In 1989, 35.2% of the sample companies are
monitored by more than 13 analysts. The sectorial representation has remained stable,
at 28%, 34% and 38% on average for the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors,
respectively. Companies for which at least three analysts provide forecasts make up
almost 95% of the TSE 300 index. The correlation coefficients between the
coefficients of variation of analysts forecasts (CV) the betas and the logarithm of the
number of analysts (LnNBA) are respectively the following: .19 (CV and beta), .20
(beta and LnNBA) and -0.029 (CV, LnNBA). The first correlation coefficients are
significantly different from zero at a 1% level, but their magnitudes are too low to
create serious multicollinearity problems. The last one is significant only at the 15%
level.
3.2 Results
Panel A of table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of (14) using OLS, WLS
and ML estimation methods and the corresponding t values, when all the observations
are used in the estimation. Panel B reports the coefficients and t values when the more
lightly followed stocks are omitted. The main results regarding the null and alternative
hypotheses (( = 0, ( > 0 and ( < 0) follow. First, one can not reject the null0 1 2
hypothesis ( = 0 for the OLS, WLS and ML estimation methods. The estimates of the0
intercept, ( , are all positive. The estimated monthly coefficients ( are respectively0 ML0
equal to .3964% and .2867% if we impose the restrictions that the companies be
followed by at least 3 or 5 analysts.
Secondly, the ( , ( and ( estimates are all positive, but we can notOLS1 GLS1 ML1
reject the null hypothesis, ( = 0. The ( estimates which take account of the1 ML1
attenuation due to measurement errors in betas are greater than the ( and (OLS1 GLS1
estimates, but do not differ statistically from zero. Depending on the restriction we
impose on the number of analysts monitoring the stocks, the estimated coefficients
( are respectively equal to .6818% and .7437%. The existence a null risk premiumML1
contradicts the concept of risk aversion. So, this a priori puzzling result requires
further analysis. The ( > 0 hypothesis is an ex ante hypothesis which does not1
exclude the possibility that the ex post slope be null, or even negative, in short bearish
market periods. In fact, Fama and French (1992) and Kothary, Shanken and Sloan
(1995) report a positive but not significant risk premium over the post-1963 period
in the United States. In Canada, Calvet and Lefoll (1985) have drawn similar
conclusions. Finally, note that the ( estimates do not differ very much from the1
average risk premium measured ex post for the 1985-89 period, that is, 1.018% with
a standard deviation of 4.5%.
Barring methodological problems mentioned in the introduction, this result likely explains part of the15
ambiguity in the conclusions drawn in previous studies. Indeed, Swidler (1988) retains in his sample all
firms monitored by at least three analysts and Peterson and Peterson (1982a,b) only retain firms monitored
by eight analysts. The former examines the dispersion of beliefs independently of the number of analysts,
while the latter de facto rules out effects possibly related to the securitys liquidity level.
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Thirdly, we reject the null hypothesis, ( = 0. All three ( , ( and (2 OLS2 WLS2 ML2
coefficient estimates are negative and significantly different from zero at a 1%
confidence level. The ( coefficient estimates are -.501% (t value: -2.808) for stocksML2
followed by at least 3 analysts and -.4898% (t value: -2.356) for stocks followed by
at least 5 analysts. These results suggest that the required rate of return on a security
with a large dispersion of beliefs is lower than on a security characterized by a small
dispersion of beliefs. This finding is consistent with the expected effect of short sales
regulation on expected returns of risky assets.
We report in table 4 the estimation results of model (15). We can not reject
the null hypothesis ( = 0 in favour of the alternative hypothesis ( > 0 except for the3 3
OLS estimation method. The negative effect of divergence of beliefs on expected
returns of risky assets is lower (in absolute value) for securities monitored by more
analysts. This effect is still negative (( +( = -.3511%), but is not significantly2 3
different from zero (t value = -1.209) . These results show that on average expected15
returns of risky assets are negatively related to the divergence of investors beliefs.
The magnitude of this effect is more important and statistically significant for illiquid
assets. These findings corroborate the general hypothesis according to which short
sales regulation induces opportunity costs which are priced by the market. Moreover,
the findings are consistent with the complementary hypothesis which stipulates that
the effect is less important for liquid assets characterized by a low probability of call-
back by the brokers.
Finally, we report in table 5 the estimation results obtained when we control
for the number of analysts, the January effect or structural changes in the two sub-
periods surrounding the October market crash. Only ML estimators are reported,
because the results are unsensitive to the estimation method. The introduction of the
control variable, LnNBA, does not modify the conclusions drawn from the estimation
of model (14). The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients associated with the betas
and the coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts are almost the same as in table 3
(Panels A and B). Only the intercept is affected by the introduction of LnNBA. As
expected, the coefficient associated with LnNBA, a measure of size, is negative but
not significantly different from zero. When January returns are excluded, the
coefficient associated with the dispersion of forecasts is equal to -.5451% and is
similar to the one observed in table 3. On the contrary, the risk premium is much
lower: 0.192% as compared to .6818%. The estimated risk premium is also very
different among the two sub-periods analyzed: 1.2288% during the 1985-October
1987 sub-period against 0.0314% during the October 1987-1989 sub-period. The
estimated coefficient associated with the dispersion of forecasts is less negative during
the second sub-period, but is still significant (-.6281% against -.4333%). Finally, we
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repeat the tests on a sub-sample composed only of companies having a fiscal year-end
in December (63% of the sample) in order to eliminate the noise induced by
considering all fiscal year-ends together. However, the results are not reported as they
are very similar to the previous ones.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Drawing from Jarrows work (1980), we derive a version of the CAPM that
accounts for both heterogeneous beliefs and short sales regulation. The relevance of
this CAPM extension becomes all the more evident in that heterogeneous agent beliefs
appear to be one of the major factors behind capital market activity (Varian, 1989),
whereas short sales regulation is an important feature of market micro-structure.
The main conclusion that follows this CAPM extension is that, in the
presence of positive risk premia, the required rates of return on risky assets are a
positive linear function of systematic risk and a negative function of opportunity costs
induced by short sales regulation. We show that in principle those opportunity costs
are positively related to the dispersion of agents beliefs and negatively related to the
securitys liquidity level. In an economy where short sales are restricted, the required
rate of return on securities with a large dispersion of beliefs is consequently lower than
that would prevail in an identical economy where short sales are not restricted.
We use Litzenberger and Ramaswamys methodology (1979) to test the
hypothesis that short sales regulation induces an opportunity cost for constrained
investors and whether this cost is priced by the market. Our study covers the 60-month
1985-1989 period and uses 13079 observations. Results indicate a significant negative
relationship between security returns and the dispersion of beliefs. This negative
relationship is consistent with the presence of opportunity costs resulting from short
sales regulation when return beliefs are heterogeneous, such that the required rate of
return on risky assets is lower than would prevail in a economy without restrictions on
short sales. Our results also corroborate the hypothesis that the average effect of short
sales regulation on the expected returns of risky assets conceals differences in security
liquidity levels. Measuring this liquidity level by the number of analysts monitoring
the security, we find that the negative relationship between security returns and
dispersion of beliefs is essentially confined to illiquid securities, that is, those
monitored by a small number of analysts. Finally, these results are not sensitive to the
introduction of different control variables: the number of analysts monitoring the stock,
the exclusion of January returns, the sub-period analyzed or companies fiscal year-
ends.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics on security risk premia distributions, systematic risk
levels and coefficients of variation of analysts earnings forecasts for every
year over the period 1985-1989
Observations Average Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
R - Rj f
1985 1967 0.0128 0.0886 0.0528 1.9741
1986 2552 0.0007 0.0966 0.2103 1.9869
1987 2579 0.0179 0.1032 0.4931 2.3204
1988 2957 0.0011 0.0877 0.5911 3.2903
1989 3024 0.0017 0.0783 0.5068 3.4702
Beta
1985 1967 0.9159 0.4389 0.3259 -0.5947
1986 2552 0.9176 0.4285 0.1764 -0.3704
1987 2579 0.9337 0.4257 0.4257 -0.4191
1988 2957 0.9948 0.3658 0.1319 -0.3243
1989 3024 1.0069 0.3536 0.0056 -0.2155
Coefficient of Variation
1985 1967 0.3687 0.8525 6.2446 48.3415
1986 2552 0.4085 0.8158 4.8445 30.0703
1987 2579 0.3707 0.8701 6.4946 51.8123
1988 2957 0.2877 0.6684 7.1839 66.8179
1989 3024 0.3524 0.8681 6.0513 44.9015
TABLE 2
Frequencies and cumulative frequencies of the number of financial analysts
on a yearly basis
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Nba Freq C.Freq Freq C.Freq Freq C.Freq Freq C.Freq Freq C.Freq
3-5 38.9 38.9 25.2 25.2 30.5 30.4 31.8 31.8 30.1 30.1
6-9 37.0 75.9 31.1 56.3 27.4 57.9 24.3 56.1 24.2 54.3
10-12 13.5 89.4 20.0 76.3 15.6 73.5 11.0 67.1 10.5 64.8
more
than 13
10.6 100.0 23.7 100.0 26.5 100.0 32.9 100.0 35.2 100
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TABLE 3
Estimates and tests of model (14) relating excess security return to systematic
risk level and the dispersion of beliefs
Intercept Beta Disp
Panel A: Companies followed by at least 3 analysts
OLS Coefficients 3.771 5,746 -6,095
t values 0.897 0.979 -3.705**
WLS Coefficients 5.628 4.677 -4856
t values 1.544 0.841 -2.732**
ML Coefficients 3.964 6.818 -5.001
t values 0.823 0.837 -2.808**
Panel B: Companies monitored by at least 5 analysts
OLS Coefficients 2.249 7.179 -4.289
t values 0.583 1.211 -2.523**
WLS Coefficients 4.551 5.313 -4.801
t values 1.219 0.931 -2.378**
ML Coefficients 2.867 7.437 -4.898
t values 0.553 0.902 -2.356**
This pooled time series cross-sectional model corresponds to the following regression:
R - R = ( + ( ß + ( DISP + , ; j=1,...,J ; t=1,...,Tjt ft 0 1 jt 2 jt jt; t
R - Rjt ft : excess return of the j security for the t month.
th th
ßjt : systematic risk level of the j security for the t month.
th th
DISPjt : divergence of analysts earnings forecasts measured by the
coefficient of variation of the j security for the t month.th th
A separate regression is computed for each month of the period. The coefficient
estimates (( , ( ,( ) are then grouped and the reported coefficient estimates are0t 1t 2t
averages of the time series coefficients ( (k=0,...2)kt
In table 3 to 5, indicates that the test is significant at the 1% level and the coefficient**
estimates are multiplied by 10 .3
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TABLE 4
Estimates and tests of model (15) relating excess security returns to their
systematic risk level and the dispersion of beliefs when permitting for
different slope effects depending on the security liquidity level.
Intercept D Beta Disp D.Disp
Total sample
OLS Coefficients 4.127 1.604 5.964 -9.709 8.994
t values 0.903 0.717 1.029 -3.254** 1.647*
WLS Coefficients 5.955 -1.778 5.194 -6.895 4.956
t values 1.621 -0.916 0.942 -2.634** 1.023
ML Coefficients 4.121 -2.051 7.881 -6.999 3.484
t values 0.843 -1.052 0.951 -2.643** 0.846
TABLE 5
Estimates and tests of model (16) relating excess security returns to their
systematic risk level and the dispersion of beliefs when controlling for missing
factors, the January effect or different sub-periods.
Intercept Beta Disp LnNBA
Panel A: Total sample
ML Coefficients 8.412 8.691 -5.391 -3.006
t values 1.511 1.023 -3.039** -1.472
Panel B: Sub-sample (all January returns are excluded)
ML Coefficients 5.241 1.912 -5.451
t values 1.138 0.261 -3.302**
Panel C: from January 1985 to September 1987
ML Coefficients 4.102 12.288 -6.289
t values 0.556 1.032 -2.387**
Panel D: from November 1987 to December 1989
ML Coefficients 6.031 0.314 -4.313
t values 1.062 0.029 -1.972**
These pooled cross-sectional time-series models correspond to the following
regressions:
R - R = (  + " D + (  ß + (  DISP + ( D DISP + > , j=1,...,J; t=1,...,T (15)jt ft 0t 0 jt 1 jt 2 jt 3 jt jt jt
R - R = (  + (  ß + (  DISP + ( Ln NBA + . , j=1,...,J; t=1,...,T (16)jt ft 0t 1 jt 2 jt 4 jt jt
where:
Ln NBAjt : logarithm of the number of analysts monitoring the j security for the t month.
th th
D DISPjt jt : the dichotomous variable crossed with the dispersion of the j security for the t month. D
th th
jt
equals 1 if the number of analysts monitoring the j security is at least 9 and 0 otherwise.th
A separate regression is computed for each month of the period. The coefficient
estimates are then grouped and the reported coefficient estimates are averages of the
time series coefficients.
The first equation becomes: RQP = (E "QE (X)) - J QSQ16 N -1f k=1 k kt t t
that is R P = (E " E (V )) - J F (V )f M k=1 k k M MN -1 2
where P and V respectively stand for the value of the market portfolio at time t=0 and t=1.M M
E (V )=P .E (R ), where R denotes one plus the rate of return on the market portfolio. Consequently, thek M M k M M
preceding equation becomes: R P = (E " P E (R )) - J P F (R ) and one can solve for J .f M k=1 k M k M M MN -1 2 2 -1
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APPENDIX 1
Transformation of the price equilibrium equation (5) into the return equilibrium equation (7)
First, we find an expression of the inverse of the sum of investors risk tolerances, J-1
(in a world without restrictions on short sales); second, we substitute this expression
of J in the equation of the risky asset equilibrium price vector (5).-1
Step 1 : Were short sales unrestricted, the equilibrium price vector would be the
following:
R P = (E " E (X)) - J SQf k =1 k kN -1
Prior multiplication of this expression by Q yields the inverse value of the sum oft
investors risk tolerances :16
J = [(E " E (R )) - R ]/[P .F (R )]-1 N 2k =1 k k M f M M
Step 2 : E (X) = D E (R), where E (R) represents the vector of risky asset expectedk k kP
returns andD represents the diagonal matrix with time 0 risky asset prices along theP
main diagonal. Furthermore, the vector of implicit prices u is equal to D v where vk P k k
stands for the vector of implicit returns. Hence, equation (7) can be rewritten as:
R P = {(E " D E (R)) - J SQ} + {E " D v } (5)f k =1 k k k =1 kN -1 NP P k
Upon prior multiplication of (7) by D , the equilibrium equation becomes:P
-1
R i = {(E " E (R)) - J D SQ} + {E " v } (5)f k =1 k k k =1 kJ P kN -1 -1 N
The j element of the vector SQ is equal to:E QCov(X ,X ) = Cov(X ,E QX )th J Ji =1 i j i j i =1 i i
= Cov(X ,E V ) = Cov(X ,V ) = PP Cov(R ,R ) where V stands for the marketj i =1 i j M j M j M j
J
value of j.
If we multiply the j element of the vector SQ by the inverse of the sum of investorsth
risk tolerances J , this element becomes: [(E " E (R )) - R ].P .ß .-1 Nk =1 k k M f j j
Hence, vector J SQ can be written as: [(E " E (R )) - R ]D ß-1 Nk =1 k k M f P
The substitution of J SQ = [(E " E (R )) - R ]D ß in (7) yields an expression-1 Nk=1 k k M f P
of the risk-return relationship prevailing in an economy where short sales are
forbidden.
R i = {(E " E (R)) - ß{(E " E (R )) - R}} + {E " v } (7)f k =1 k k k =1 k k M f k =1 kJ kN N N
Given the form of this expression, the proof will be somewhat analoguous to that of the second degree17
stochastic dominance.
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(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
APPENDIX 2
Consider two distributions of investors beliefs X and Y with means µ =µ andX Y
standard deviations F > F . The average opportunity costs induced by short sales inX Y
each case are respectively:
We can show that :17
Thus, v is a positive function of F=DISP.
Proof:
Define:
u(t)=g(t) and u(t)=g(t)
s(t)=F (t)-F (t) and s(t)=f (t)-f (t)X Y X Y
Integration by parts gives:
The first term is equal to zero, for F (µ )=F (µ )=1/2 and F (-4)=F (-4).X X Y X X Y
We know that g(t)<0 and F (t)-F (t)>0, consequently, the second term is positive.X Y
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(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
APPENDIX 3
When short sales are forbidden, the opportunity cost the k investor whose beliefs areth
lower than the consensus beliefs with respect to the j security is equal to theth
difference between the consensus expected rate of return, µ , and the rate the k agentj
th
expects, E (R). If we assume that investor beliefs are normally distributed with meank j
µ and a dispersion F , the density of probabilities f(t) is equal to:j j
and the effect of short sales regulation on risky asset returns can be written as:
After the variable change: z = (t - µ )/F , the above integral becomes:j j
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